We propose a quantum copy-protection system which protects classical information in the form of non-orthogonal quantum states. The decryption of the stored information is not possible in the classical representation and the decryption mechanism of data qubits is realized by secret unitary rotations. We define an authentication method for the proposed copy-protection scheme and analyse the success probabilities of the authentication process. A possible experimental realization of the scheme is also presented.
Introduction
In classical computer science, any data that can be read can be copied an unlimited number of times. There is no theoretical limit on the copying of classical data within classical communication. The best solution we can expect is that the media that carry these data should not be duplicable. On the other hand, the rise of quantum information processing reveals that with quantum information a higher level of security can be expected. The entertainment and classical computer industry use every technical and legal means possible to prevail against pirates and the main purpose is to implement widespread copy prevention of digital files. However, cloning a quantum state is an impossible task and this is called the nocloning theorem (Wootters and Zurek, 1982) . The no-cloning theorem was first shown by Wooters and Zurek and this theory is closely concerned with other quantum information processing such as state estimation and quantum cloning. In the quantum world, the quantum states cannot be copied perfectly, according to the no-cloning theorem (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) . The proposed quantum-based data protection system uses the fundamental difference between classical and quantum information (Imre and Balazs, 2005) . The classical data are stored in the secret rotation angles of non-orthogonal quantum states. We show that secret quantum decoding operations can be implemented with some associated error, which decreases exponentially with the number of quantum states of the angle state.
Quantum encryption
In the classical world, copy-protecting is trivially impossible. In this paper we show a new quantum-based data protection system, which stores the classical data inside the encoded quantum states on the data medium. In the proposed quantum-based data protection system, Alice can always read the classical data, while no one but the original Issuer knows the original quantum states that carry these classical data. Even though an unauthorized user can try to copy some other quantum states storing the same classical data, these quantum states can be distinguished from the original ones. The classical data are stored in quantum states, whose states are perfectly readable by Alice or any user. Although the classical data is readable by anyone, these classical bits are encoded bits, thus Alice or any user needs a decryption key to decode the information. The secret quantum information is stored in the rotation angles of the qubits. In the authentication process, the system verifies the decoding quantum key, which is stored on the data medium. The method uses non-orthogonal quantum states, furthermore both secret key states and data states are non-orthogonal quantum states (Imre and Balazs, 2005) .
Encoding by polarization angle of quantum bits
In this paper, we will concentrate on the basic idea of the proposed quantum-based data protection system, in the absence of errors caused by technical problems. Although with the implementation of quantum error correcting codes the proposed scheme can be adjusted to fit realistic settings. The quantum states used are nonorthogonal quantum states, the polarization of quantum bits is rotated by a certain angle (Imre and Balazs, 2005) . b (Imre and Balazs, 2005 ). The components not in the sub-vector space are discarded. Alice can use projector to filter out everything other than the subspace she is looking for (Imre and Balazs, 2005) . If Alice has a pirated data medium, she wants to project a false quantum state
into a valid cos 0 sin 1
state, however she can only do this with a non-zero error rate . Alice can make an arbitrary projective measurement in the XZ plane, however the projected quantum states can only pass the verification process with probability ( ) , which becomes exponentially small as the length of the string increases . Thus, if Alice has a pirated disk, she cannot decode the quantum states correctly, and she gets only useless garbage data. The quantum state e 1 n e -i q can never be cloned perfectly because the angle is kept secret from Alice and others and it can be varied within the range é ë . To conclude the purpose of the proposed system, Alice can retrieve perfectly the encoded classical data stored in the quantum states on the data medium without the help of the provider (Brassard et al. 2007) .
In Figure 2 we illustrate the situation if Alice sends her angle state to the Issuer, who verifies the angle of the sent quantum state. Only the provider can check whether the quantum states on the data medium are original or not, and only the provider knows the decryption key for the encoded quantum states. Thus, Alice gains no benefit from the knowledge of the classical data stored on the data medium, because these bits are encoded bits and the decoding key is operating on quantum states.
3
Quantum-based data medium authentication
The data states and secret key states are encrypted by secret rotation angles. In order to read the disguised quantum bits correctly, Alice must rotate the i-th data quantum bit by the secret angle in the opposite direction to the Issuer. We can assume for example, that our data state
, where a and b are complex coefficients, is a single quantum bit encoded by the rotation operator This rotation operator in matrix form is:
The copy-protection of these rotation angles relies on the no-cloning theorem (Wootters and Zurek, 1982) . If a superposition state is measured, the result will be one of two orthogonal states and no information regarding the rotation angle is left. In the authentication method, both the data states, and the data decryption keys are non-orthogonal states. We will describe this method in this paper further on. The security of the proposed scheme relies on the no-cloning theorem (Wootters and Zurek, 1982 ( )
for each polarization state of qubit i y . A photon chosen from a given set of polarization states can only be perfectly cloned if the polarization angles in the set are distinct, and are all mutually orthogonal (Imre and Balazs, 2005) . The unknown non-orthogonal states cannot be cloned perfectly, the cloning process of the quantum states is possible only if the information being cloned is classical, hence the quantum states are all orthogonal. The polarization states are not all orthogonal states, which makes it impossible for the eavesdropper to copy the sender's quantum states (Brassard, 2006) .
Brief overview of quantum information processing
In this section, we give a brief overview of quantum mechanics, and we introduce the basic notation which will be used in the text. In quantum information processing, the logical values of classical bits are replaced by state vectors 0 and 1 , which is the Dirac notation. Contrary to classical bits, a qubit y can also be A unitary transformation (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) can be defined as † † ,
where , hence the adjoint is equal to the transpose of the complex conjugate and I is the identity matrix (Imre and Balazs, 2005) . .
The state of an n-qubit length quantum register is a vector in a -dimensional complex vector space, hence if the number of qubits in the quantum register increases linearly, the dimension of the vector space increases exponentially (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) .
, then the inner product in matrix representation can be expressed as
The outer product between two vectors j and y can be defined as y j , (Imre and Balazs, 2005) . The matrix of the outer product y j is obtained by the usual matrix multiplication of a column matrix by a row matrix, however the matrix multiplication can be replaced by a tensor product, since
+ 1 , the outer product in matrix representation can be expressed as
In Figure 3 , we illustrate the general model of an n-length quantum register, where the input state i y is either 0 or 1 , generally. After the application of a unitary transformation U on the input states, the state of the quantum register can be given by state vector y . The unitary operator U is a matrix, with -in principle -an infinite number of possible operators. Figure 3 General sketch of an n-length quantum register
n´n
The result of the measurement of state y results in zeros and ones that form the final result of the quantum computation, based on the n-length qubit string stored in the quantum register (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) .
Storing information in rotation angles
We distinguish data
qubit states on the data medium. The decryption mechanism is realized by secret unitary rotations, therefore the required secret is stored in the rotation angles of the key qubits. Alice takes the data quantum states from the data medium and her i-th qubit is valid iff the qubit can be projected into (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) , (Kim et al., 2002) .
Thereby the data string is valid iff all the qubits from the string can be projected successfully. Thus, if Alice wants to copy an original string from the data medium, she has to know all the , secret rotation angles. In the proposed system, Alice has a chance not greater than to read the states exactly from the data medium, because she doesn't know the original rotation angle of the i-th qubit . We would consider approximate those transformations where the output state of the transformation is only an approximation to
If the angle transformation does succeed, the output
The a priori probability of decryption success depends both on the data quantum state
and on the quality of the stored rotation operation (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) . Thus, the quality of the proposed quantum-based decryption transformation is quantified by the average of a priori 
can be used to store this The decryption method's control qubit corresponds to the data qubit . q  d , while the target qubit is equal to the decryption key state q . Thus, using a simple CNOT transformation (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) , the state is transformed to (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) .
Data states and key states on data medium
We store unitary operation in the rotation angle 
, which corresponds to an arbitrar und the ẑ -axis of a spin (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) . The secret key state can also given by ½ particle be ( ) If Alice buys a valid data medium from a store and she tries to read the quantum-protected data medium at home, she doesn't know the secret key q nor the complex coefficients a and b . However she can read the data medium successfully, because she is able to prepare the decrypted state d q  from the unknown projected but still unmeasured encrypted data and the projected but still unmeasured unknown secret key. The readout process of the superposition quantum states and the encryption process might be controlled by Alice's quantum-CPU with a pre-prepared Quantum Instruction List stored on the medium. Alice's encryption process is defined only in the angles of quantum states in the Hilbert space .
 The secret rotations are implemented by a quantum-CPU in Alice's reader device with a data and program register. The data register contains the readout data quantum states, while the program register contains the readout key states. The device's quantum processing unit uses the readout non-orthogonal quantum states stored in the data and program register (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) . 
MEASUREMENT
The quantum CPU's data register contains the readout data quant e program register contains the readout key states. The de ce's quantum e um states, whil vi th processing unit uses the readout non-orthogonal quantum states stored in the data and program register.
Decrypting unknown data with unknown secret key
In order to implement the unknown unitary transformation on unknown data q  state d , Alice has to perform a CNOT operation (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) 
Therefore, a projective measurement on the basis { } performing the wished operation and will be unable to read the data medium correctly. In order to construct a more efficient solution, we use multi-qubit secret key states (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) , (Kim et al., 2002 (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) . Thus, the best she can do after sh as measured the qubit which is stored on the data medium is to leave it as it is after the measurement. In this case, she gets the correct i q with probability e h 2 1 1 sin 2 , 2
therefore Alice's total pr ability of coping with quantum states with ob valid n rotation angles i q is 2 1 1 1 sin 2 2 .
Thus, by increasing n, Alice's probability of success can be made arbitrarily tate realized by multi-qubit string f the proposed n ae small (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) .
One-qubit secret key s
In this section we show the data storage and decryption method o system. The one-qubit secret key state cos 0 sin 1 (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) , (Kim et al., 2002 Figure 7 contains a Toffoli-gate, which acts as a CNOT-gate (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) between the first and third line of the circuit only if the second line carries a 1 state. If the second line carries 1 , this means that the previous measurement on key state q failed. In the case of a new failure, Alice can correct it by inserting this state again, together with state 4q (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) .
Figure 7
The decryption of a single-qubit data with multi-qubit key states. The secret angle state is stored in two quantum states
If Alice has no luck and keeps on failing, she can try to correct the state as many times as she wishes, provided that the state state's secret string length l (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) , (Kim et al., 2002) . This gate is shown in Figure 8 .
Figure 8
The decryption of single-qubit data with multi-qubit key state. The secret angle state is stored in an l-length quantum string
In Figure 9 , Alice's simplified quantum circuit is equivalent to the previous gate, since it takes the unknown data state d as the control, and the unknown secret key state q as the target of the CNOT-gate (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) . Depending on the result of a measurement on the key qubit state, Alice produces either d
Figure 9
The decryption of single-qubit data with key qubit state. The short diagonal line on the bottom line indicates that the secret key bit state consists of several quantum bits
The verification uses an l-qubit for the realization of every secret q rotation angle. Thus, every rotation transformation succeeds with probability
, with error probability (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) .
Since the Issuer writes only a one-state decryption key to the data medium, Alice fails to perform Thus, a two-qubit state for a single-qubit data is sufficient, on average (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) , (Kim et al., 2002) .
Entropy of secret angle states
We have seen that, on average, a two-qubit state is sufficient to store and retrieve any angle state. In this Section we step forward, and we claim that we can store the unitary operation with arbitrary, unknown q angle using on average less than four quantum bits, if The rotation operator for arbitrary can be implemented by a sequence of operations of the form with binary The total number of quantum states needed to store and retrieve the angle state, with arbitrary for 1 is on average given
That is, less than four quantum states per angle state are required on average to store an arbitrary, unknown operation of the form and in the previous sections we have seen that on average two qubits suffice to implement (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) .
Distribution of quantum copy protected data medium
Alice will be able to obtain the result of the l-length decryption operation This means that Alice, or anyone who buys an original quantum copy-protected data medium, has to be able to compute the secret decrypting unitary operator
on an n-qubit data string ( ) because Alice can in principle distinguish between orthogonal states (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) . If Alice tries to copy
, then she will necessarily modify the key state, which will result in an incorrect decrypted state (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) . That is, it is not possible for Alice to copy, even in an approximate form, the secret key state or to decrypt the data states. An N-qubit length unknown
the maximally mixed state (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) . Let assume be the probability of a successful transformation
The quantity to be maximized is 2
, the average probability of success (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) . If we choose a random angle and transform the state In Figure 10 we show the probability success as a function of the length of the key qubit string. The vertical axis represents the probability of success, the horizontal axis shows the length of the input qubit string. (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) .
The hash quantum state
Let us assume that the secret decryption key and the i-th data state are stored on the quantum-based data medium in quantum states
to generate a single-qubit hash state from the states of the decryption key and then she has to apply it to a fixed data qubit. Finally, she has to compare it with the validated result.
The secret key of the secret key is a single qubit state, and it can be generated using (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) . In Figure 11 , we show the case if the original hash state is stored by the Issuer. After the Issuer receives the computed hash state 
Figure 12
Generation process of hash quantum angle state. Every angle state rotates the previous state by a certain angle. After the rotations, the Issuer identifies the quantum data medium
We assume that the length of the key is n, so she finally takes the n-th qubit n q of the key, and she gets the appropriate state
iff all of the key states are valid. In Figure 13 , we show the preparation of the hash state using a single-qubit data qubit d .
Figure 13
The preparation of the hash state on single-qubit data. The i-th rotation operator is realized by the key state which is stored in a multi-qubit string
 is generated from the secret key and the fixed data qubit, Alice uses a simple controlled-SWAP gate (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) . The two inputs of the controlled-SWAP gate are the generated hash state
, which is stored on the data medium. The gate is shown in Figure 14 .
Figure 14
The controlled-SWAP gate (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) test to check the prepared hash state
If we assume that the two inputs f and y are equal, then the output of the gate is 0, with probability
If it was the case that f y = , then we know that this answer is always correct because we will always measure 0. In Figure 15 , the original hash state is denoted by
, the hash for verification process -computed from key angle states -is denoted by
The angle between hash states y and f determines the probability of success of the SWAP test (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) .
Figure 15
Distance between valid and invalid quantum state from a pirated disk
In Figure 16 , we illustrate the probability of success of a SWAP test-based (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) hash state verification process. The vertical axis represents the probability of success of verification, the horizontal-axis represents the difference between the generated and original hash states. As can be concluded, if the hash states are equal f y = , then the SWAP test will determine the validity with probability of success 1. Otherwise, if the two states are orthogonal to each other, then the result of the test becomes fully quantum probabilistic (Imre and Balazs, 2005) , and if the Issuer measures 1, the received hash state will be rejected. In Figure 16 , we show the probability of success for a one-qubit length quantum system. The probability of success of the SWAP test (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) increasing exponentially with the number of qubits in the hash string increases linearly (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000) . 

As can be concluded, for an n-length quantum system, the probability of success of the test becomes ( ) 
Security of medium verification method
In summary, if Alice is a malevolent user and she wants to pass the verification process with a modified pirated disk, then:
 she has to identify all the secret rotation angles 1 q to n q of the key which is impossible according to the no-cloning theorem (Wootters and Zurek, 1982) , or she has to generate a valid 
Multi-qubit decryption
After the verification process has succeeded, Alice can use the states of the decryption key D y  to rotate the encrypted data states in one-step, as shown in Figure 17 .
Figure 17
Decryption of an n-length multi-qubit data string with an n-length multi-qubit key-string. Each state of the key is realized by an l-length multi-qubit string. The i-th secret angle state operates on the i-th data qubit
The presented quantum data medium could be implemented in practice by a transmission-reflective type holographic optical disk and the readout process could be carried out by a holographic reader device. The rotation process uses a quantum CPU, implemented inside the reader device.
Figure 18
An experimental realization of the quantum copy-protection system
Quantum-CPU
In the proposed model, the and Pauli-transformations could be realized by holographic and optical elements. With the help of these optical elements, an arbitrary unitary quantum transformation could be prepared effectively (Chuang et al., 2008) . 
The holographic optical data medium
The quantum protected data medium is an information carrier that includes information in the form of a hologram. In order to increase protection against copying, the implemented hologram is the combination of a transmission hologram and a reflection hologram. The data and the key states on the quantum protected medium are encoded holographically. The object state is equal to the encoded data or key quantum state, while the reference state is equivalent to its orthogonal state.
Figure 19
The reflective transmission holographic optical disk Such information carriers frequently serve as security seals for characterizing trademark products. The layer structure of reflective transmission holographic optical disk is illustrated in Figure 19 .
Conclusions and future work
This paper introduces a fundamentally new method for protecting classical data by quantum states. The software Issuer stores the classical data in quantum states on the original distributed quantum-based data medium. The classical data on the data medium can be read out easily by anyone, but these classical bits are encoded bits. The decoding key rotates the angles of the quantum bits, thus some qubit values remain unchanged while some quantum states rotate to reverse their value and therefore the projected values of the classical bits. The absolute security of the proposed method rests on the laws of quantum dynamics. The operations can be implemented with some associated error, which decreases exponentially with the number of quantum states of the angle state. In further analysis of the proposed quantum-based data protection system, we would like to make an in-depth study of the applicability of quantum cloning machines, which can be used to produce the clones of quantum states.
